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We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for
a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance
relation. The social structure is utilized to reﬁne the core of the game, being the set of
payoﬀs to the players that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. For every
coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the social
structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoﬀ vector socially stable if at
the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power. The socially
stable core of the game consists of the core elements that are socially stable. In case the
social structure is such that every player in a coalition has the same power, social stability
reduces to balancedness and the socially stable core coincides with the core.
We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable. In
general the socially stable core consists of a ﬁnite number of faces of the core and generically
consists of a ﬁnite number of payoﬀ vectors. Convex TU-games have a non-empty socially
stable core, irrespective of the power function. When there is a clear hierarchy of players
in terms of power, the socially stable core of a convex TU-game consists of exactly one
element, an appropriately deﬁned marginal vector. We demonstrate the usefulness of the
concept of the socially stable core by two applications. One application concerns sequencing
games and the other one the distribution of water.
JEL classiﬁcation: C60, C70, D70
Key words: Transferable Utility game, Social structure, Balancedness, Core1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. In a
TU-game players only diﬀer with respect to their position in the game. Examples of mod-
els in which players not only diﬀer with respect to their position in the game, but also
are part of some relational structure (which possibly aﬀects the cooperation possibilities
or payoﬀ distributions) are games in coalition structure and games with limited communi-
cation structure. In games with coalition structure it is assumed that the set of players
is partitioned into disjoint sets which represent social groups. For a particular player it is
more easy to cooperate with players in his own group than to cooperate with players in
other groups (see, e.g., Aumann and Dr` eze (1974), Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983) and
Winter (1989)). In games with limited communication structure the edges of an undirected
graph on the set of players represent binary communication links between the players such
that players can cooperate only if they are connected (see, e.g. Myerson (1977), Kalai,
Postlewaite and Roberts (1978), Owen (1986) and Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)).
Another line of research in the ﬁeld of cooperative games are situations in which
the players are part of some hierarchical structure such as the games with a permission
structure. In such games it is assumed that players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical
organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before
they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition, see for instance Gilles, Owen and van den
Brink (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996). Related is also the model of Faigle and
Kern (1992) who consider feasible rankings of the players. Players are also hierarchically
ordered in the paper of van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2003). However, instead
of restricting the cooperation possibilities, in the latter paper the hierarchical ordering
directly aﬀects the distribution of the so-called Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi (1959))
of the game amongst the players.
In this paper we consider TU-games in which there is a social structure on the
set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation. Instead of
restricting the cooperation possibilities or the distribution of the Harsanyi dividends, the
social ordering is utilized to select certain payoﬀ vectors within the core of the game.
Therefore we assign to any coalition a power vector, whose components reﬂect the relative
strengths of the individual members of the coalition. To derive the main results, we will
take the power vector as exogenously given, but in some applications we will use suitable
methods known from the literature to determine the strength of an individual within the
particular organizational structure.
Given the power vectors, we use the concept of socially stable core to select a subset
of the core of the game. This concept has been introduced in Herings, van der Laan and
1Talman (2003) within the more general framework of Nontransferable Utility Games. For a
payoﬀ vector to be in the socially stable core, there should be neither incentives to deviate
from an economic point of view, nor from a social one. A payoﬀ vector is economically stable
if it is feasible and undominated, i.e. when the payoﬀ vector is in the core of the game.
No player has an incentive to deviate from a core payoﬀ vector from an economic point of
view. Socially motivated deviations do not occur when all individuals are equally powerful
at the proposed payoﬀ vector. This is formalized by considering the power vectors of all
coalitions that could realize the proposed payoﬀ vector. If there is a weighted sum of these
power vectors that gives all individuals the same power, then individuals are said to be
equally powerful at the proposed payoﬀ. Obviously, the socially stable core consisting of all
payoﬀ vectors that are economically and socially stable is a subset of the core. Generically,
it is shown to be a proper subset of the core consisting of a ﬁnite number of elements only,
and therefore it can be considered as a core selection device.
We deﬁne the property of social stability for a socially structured game and refer
to games satisfying this property as socially stable games. It will be shown that a socially
stable game has a non-empty socially stable core. We also show that a convex game is
socially stable for any social structure and thus has a non-empty socially stable core. When
there is a clear hierarchy of players in terms of power, the socially stable core of a convex
TU-game consists of exactly one element. This element corresponds to the marginal vector
that is consistent with the ordering of players according to their respective power.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by some
applications in which the social structure on the players arises naturally from the char-
acteristics of the economic situation. Amongst these examples are the water distribution
problem and sequencing situations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries. In Sec-
tion 3 socially structured transferable utility games are introduced as well as the associated
solution concept of the socially stable core. In Section 4 the main theorem is presented
and it is proven that a convex game is socially stable. Section 5 contains examples and
applications and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a
pair (N,v), with N = {1,2...,n} a ﬁnite set of n players and v:2 N → I R a characteristic
function assigning to any coalition S ⊆ N of players a real number v(S)a st h eworth of
coalition S with v(∅) = 0, i.e. the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of
2v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. In this paper we assume that N is a ﬁxed set of players,
allowing to denote a game (N,v) shortly by its characteristic function v. A TU-game v
is superadditive if v(S ∪ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for any pair of subsets S,T ⊆ N such that
S ∩ T = ∅. Further, a TU-game v is convex if v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all
S,T ⊆ N. We denote the collection of all TU-games on N by G and the collection of all
convex TU-games on N by Gc. A solution F assigns a set F(v) ⊂ IR
n of payoﬀ vectors to
every TU-game v ∈G . A well-known set-valued solution is the Core, assigning to every








xi ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
It is well-known that C(v) is non-empty if and only if v is balanced (see Bondareva (1963)).
An important point-valued solution is the Shapley value. This value can be deﬁned
in several ways, for instance as a weighted sum of the so-called marginal contributions (see
Shapley (1953)) or as an equal distribution of the so-called Harsanyi dividends of coalitions
(see Harsanyi (1959)) amongst the players in the coalitions. Because of reasons later on
in this paper, we use here the concept of marginal vector to deﬁne the Shapley value. For
a permutation π:N → N, assigning rank number π(i) ∈ N to any player i ∈ N, deﬁne
πi = {j ∈ N|π(j) ≤ π(i)}, i.e., πi is the set of all players with rank number at most equal
to the rank number of i, including i himself. Then the marginal value vector mπ(v) ∈ IR
n





i \{ i}),i ∈ N,
and thus assigns to player i his marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition consisting
of all his predecessors in π. The Shapley value is equal to the average of the marginal value
vectors over all permutations. When v is convex, the core of v is equal to the convex hull
of all marginal value vectors and thus the Shapley value is in the core.
Ag a m e( N,v) is called permutationally convex, see Granot and Huberman (1982), if
there exists a permutation π such that for all 1 ≤ j<k<nit holds that max[v(S),v (πj∪
S)−v(πj)] ≤ v(πk ∪S)−v(πk) for all S ⊂ N \πk.W h e n( N,v) is permutationally convex
with respect to the permutation π, it holds that the corresponding marginal vector mπ(v)
is in the core C(v) and, hence, the core is non-empty.
3 Structured TU-Games
In this paper we assume that there is a social structure on any coalition of players. This
social structure could be, for example, a structure where one agent is the leader of the
coalition and makes all the decisions, while all other agents of the coalition follow him, a
3structure in which all members of the coalition are in an equal position to each other and
decisions are made by a unanimity or majority voting rule, or a hierarchy in which the
agents are ordered on several levels. We assume that the social structure is represented by
a power vector reﬂecting the relative strengths of the individual members of the coalition
within the social structure. For example, in a hierarchy the agent at the top of the hierarchy
has more power within the coalition than the other coalition members, whereas within a
coalition in which the members are in an equal position to each other, all members have
the same power.
A structured TU-game (STG) is given by the characteristic function v and a power
function p from N to Sn, where N =2 N \∅is the collection of all non-empty subsets of
N and Sn = {x ∈ IR
n |
￿
i∈N xi =1a n dxi ≥ 0,i∈ N} is the (n − 1)-dimension unit
simplex. For S ∈N , the nonnegative number pi(S) denotes the power of agent i ∈ N
within the social structure on S. It is assumed that every player outside the coalition S has
power equal to zero, every agent within S has a nonnegative power with a strictly positive
power for at least one of these players, and the total power has been normalized to one,
i.e. for every S ⊂ N, we have that pi(S) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S, pi(S) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S and
￿
i∈S pi(S) = 1. We now have the following deﬁnition of a structured TU-game (STG).
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Structured TU-Game)
A structured TU-game is given by the triple Γ=( N,v,p).
We are interested in payoﬀ vectors that are socially and economically stable.I fa n
individual at a certain payoﬀ vector has more power than another individual, then he is
assumed to be able to increase his payoﬀ at the expense of the other individual. Such
a payoﬀ vector is not socially stable. To deﬁne social stability of a payoﬀ vector x in a
structured game STG Γ = (N,v,p) formally, we ﬁrst deﬁne the set of feasible power vectors
for a payoﬀ vector x, where x(S)=
￿
i∈S xi denotes the total payoﬀ to the players in S.
T h es e to ff e a s i b l ep o w e rv e c t o r sf o rap a y o ﬀv e c t o rx is deﬁned by
FP(x)={y ∈ S
n | y =
￿
{S∈N|x(S)≤v(S)}




with the convention that FP(x)=∅ when x(S) >v (S) for all S ∈N. The set of feasible
power vectors for x is equal to the set of all convex combinations of power vectors of all
coalitions S for which x(S) ≤ v(S). Notice that the set of feasible power vectors for an
arbitrary payoﬀ vector in I R
n is a, possibly empty, convex set and is a subset of Sn. A
payoﬀ vector is called socially stable if the vector 1/n·eN is contained in its set of feasible
power vectors, where eN denotes the n-dimensional vector of ones.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Socially Stable Payoﬀ)
For a socially structured game Γ=( N,v,p) a payoﬀ vector x ∈ IR
n is socially stable if
FP(x) contains the vector 1/n · eN.
4Social stability of a payoﬀ vector x means that nonnegative real numbers or weights
can be assigned to the coalitions S for which x(S) ≤ v(S) in such a way that the weighted
total power of every agent is equal to 1/n and therefore the same for every agent. It will
be useful to deﬁne stability of a collection of coalitions without reference to a particular
payoﬀ vector.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Stable Collection of Coalitions)
A collection of coalitions in N, {S1,...,S k},i sstable if the system of equations
k  
j=1
λjp(Sj)=1 /n · e
N
has a nonnegative solution. A stable collection of coalitions in N is minimal if no proper
subset of it is stable.
A socially stable payoﬀ vector is therefore a payoﬀ vector whose components can be
achieved by every element of some stable collection of coalitions for its members. Observe
that the deﬁnition of a stable collection reduces to the standard concept of balancedness
when for any S ∈Nit holds that pi(S)=1 /|S|, i ∈ S. In the remaining we denote this
case by p = e.
A socially stable payoﬀ vector may not be achieved by the grand coalition. In
general, a payoﬀ vector x is said to be feasible if it can be attained by the grand coalition.
Furthermore, social stability of a payoﬀ vector x does not imply that x is undominated, i.e.
there may exist an S ∈Nand y ∈ IR
n satisfying y(S) ≤ v(S)a n dyi >x i for all i ∈ S.A
feasible payoﬀ vector which is undominated is called economically stable. Clearly a payoﬀ
vector x is economically stable if and only if x is in the core of v. The set of all socially
and economically stable payoﬀ vectors is called the socially stable core of the game.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Socially Stable Core)
The socially stable core of a structured TU-game Γ=( N,v,p) consists of the set of socially
and economically stable payoﬀ vectors of Γ.
A payoﬀ vector x lies in the socially stable core if and only if x is in the core of the
game (economic stability) and can be sustained by a socially stable collection of coalitions
(social stability). For a game Γ = (N,v,p), we denote the set of payoﬀ vectors in the
socially stable core by SC(v,p). Observe that the grand coalition is a stable collection
when p = e.H e n c e ,SC(v,p)=C(v)w h e np = e.
54 Non-emptiness of the Socially Stable Core
In this section we give suﬃcient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core
of a structured TU-game. When p = e, we know from Bondareva (1963) that the socially
stable core coincides with the core and hence the socially stable core is non-empty if and
only if the game is balanced. For an arbitrary power function p, the socially stable core is a
subset of the core and might be empty even if the core is not empty, i.e., the balancedness
condition for TU-games is not suﬃcient for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core
when p  = e. However, the next deﬁnition of social stability of the game Γ generalizes the
balancedness deﬁnition and provides a suﬃcient condition for the non-emptiness of the
socially stable core. A socially structured game is called socially stable if every socially
stable payoﬀ vector can be achieved by the grand coalition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Socially Stable Game)
A structured TU-game Γ=( N,v,p) is socially stable if any socially stable payoﬀ x is
feasible.
It should be observed that this social stability condition reduces to the usual bal-
ancedness condition for p = e. We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2
A structured TU-game Γ=( N,v,p) h a san o n - e m p t ys o c i a l l ys t a b l ec o r ei ss o c i a l l ys t a b l e .
Proof. The proof follows from a more general theorem for socially structured NTU-games
given in Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2003). Q.E.D.
The theorem above requires feasibility to be shown for any socially stable payoﬀ
vector. This may be a demanding task. The next theorem says that any convex game has
a non-empty socially stable core.
Theorem 4.3
If v is a convex game, then for any power function p the structured TU-game Γ=( N,v,p)
has a non-empty socially stable core.
Proof. To prove non-emptiness, we ﬁrst construct for any given power function p a stable
collection of coalitions.
Step 1. Set k =1 ,Sk = N, qk =1 /n · eN,a n drk = n.G o t oS t e p2 .
6Step 2. Deﬁne Tk = {j ∈ Sk |pj(Sk)/qk
j =m a x h∈Sk ph(Sk)/qk
h} and tk = |Tk|. Deﬁne
λk =( m a x h∈Sk ph(Sk)/qk
h)−1.G o t oS t e p3 .
Step 3. For j ∈ Tk, deﬁne π(j) ∈ N such that {π(j) | j ∈ Tk} = {rk,r k−1,...,r k−tk+1}.
If rk = tk,d e ﬁ n ek∗ = k and stop the procedure; otherwise set k = k +1a n dg o t oS t e p4 .
Step 4. Set Sk = Sk−1 \ Tk−1, qk = qk−1 − λkp(Sk−1)a n drk = rk−1 − tk−1 = |Sk| > 0.
Return to step 2.
By construction we have that the collection {S1,S 2,...,S k∗} is a stable collection of coali-
tions and that π =( π(1),π(2),...,π(n)) is a permutation of the elements of N such that
for any k =1 ,...,k ∗ it holds that




Next take the power vector x equal to the marginal vector mπ(v). Then it follows for any








j \{ j})) = v(π
 k)=v(Sk).
By construction of the sets Sk it follows that x is socially stable. Moreover, since v is
convex we also have that x ∈ C(v). Hence x ∈ SC(v,p). Q.E.D.
Observe that the marginal vector constructed in the proof is unique if and only if
k∗ = n and thus |Tk| =1f o ra l lk.W h e n f o r s o m e k, Tk contains multiple players, we
can take in Step 3 any order of sequence of the players within Tk. So, in general there
are Πk |Tk| diﬀerent marginal vectors satisfying the conditions and thus being elements of
SC(v,p).
The assumptions in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are independent, i.e. socially stability of
Γ does not imply convexity of v and vice versa. Clearly, when p = e, Γ is socially stable
when v satisﬁes balancedness. However, balancedness of v does not imply convexity. The
following example shows that convexity of v does not imply social stability of Γ.
Example 4.4 Take N = {1,2,3}, v(1) = v(3) = v(1,3) = 0, v(2) = v(1,2) = v(2,3) =
v(1,2,3) = 1. Take any power vector function p such that p(1,2) = (2,1,0)  and p(2,3) =
(0,1,2) . Clearly this game is convex, so the socially stable core of Γ = (N,v,p)i sn o n -
empty. We show that Γ is not socially stable. Notice that x =( 1 ,0,1)  is a socially stable
payoﬀ vector sustained by the stable collection of coalitions {{1,2}, {2,3}}. However, x
is not feasible and thus Γ = (N,v,p) is not socially stable. Q.E.D.
7For a collection of coalitions F⊂N ,d e ﬁ n e
C
F(v)={x ∈ C(v) | x(S)=v(S),for all S ∈F} ,
i.e., CF(v)i sa( p o s s i b l ye m p t y )f a c eo fC(v). When x ∈ SC(v,p) lies in the (relative)
interior of a face CF(v) of the core, then every point of the face CF(v) belongs to SC(v,p).
Hence, SC(v,p) is equal to the union of a ﬁnite number of faces of C(v). The following
example shows that the socially stable core may consist of two or more disjoint faces.
Example 4.5 Take N = {1,2,3}, v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1,2) = 2, v(1,3) = v(2,3) =
3, v(1,2,3) = 6. Clearly this game is convex. The core of this game is equal to C(v)=
{x ∈ IR
3| 0 ≤ x1,x 2 ≤ 3, 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 4,x 1 + x2 + x3 =6 }.T a k e p(1,2) = (3,1,0) ,
p(1,3) = (3,0,1) , p(2,3) = (0,3,1) , p(1,2,3) = (2,1,3) . For this power function the
socially stable core SC(v,p) consists of the two marginal vectors (2,0,4)  and (3,3,0) .
The point (2,0,4)  is sustained by the stable collection B1 = {{1,2,3}, {1,2}, {2}} and
the point (3,3,0)  by the stable collection B2 = {{1,3}, {2,3}, {3}}. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.3 implies that for convex games v the socially stable core is non-empty
for all power functions p. When the power function p is such that for some permutation π
a player i has little power in any coalition involving players from N \πi, the socially stable
core can be shown to consist of a unique element given by the marginal vector mπ(v). To
make this statement more precise, we introduce the notion of π-compatibility.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Ap o w e rf u n c t i o np : N→Sn is π-compatible for a permutation π of N,
when for all players i ∈ N, for all coalitions S containing i such that S ∩ (N \ πi)  = ∅, it
holds that pi(S) < 1/n.
When a power function is π-compatible, the power of a player i in any coalition
that involves another player that is ranked higher according to π, is less than 1/n.
Theorem 4.7 Consider a structured TU-game (N,v,p), where v is convex and p is π-
compatible for some permutation π of N. Then the socially stable core contains the marginal
vector mπ(v) as its unique element.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the permutation π corresponds to
the ordering, π(i)=n+1−i, i =1 ,...,n. Let the payoﬀ vector x belong to SC(v,p)a n d
let {S1,...,S m} be a stable collection of coalitions with (λ1,...,λ m) a vector of weights
such that
 m
j=1 λjp(Sj)=1 /n · eN and x(Sj) ≤ v(Sj)f o rj =1 ,...,m.
We deﬁne the ordering ≺  on N by S ≺  T if and only if the lowest ranked individual
in S∪T not in S∩T belongs to S. Without loss of generality, we may choose {S1,...,S m}
to be minimal, and we can order the coalitions such that Sj ≺  Sj+1.
8We claim that, for i =1 ,...,m,this stable collection satisﬁes i ∈ Si ⊂{ i,...,n}.
Suppose that {S1,...,S m} does not contain the singleton coalition {n}. Since p is π-










a contradiction. Consequently, {S1,...,S m} does contain the singleton coalition {n}, and
by the properties of ≺  it follows that Sm = {n}.
We now use an induction argument to proceed. Assume it is true that, for some
k  ≤ m, for k =1 ,...,k  ,n− k ∈ Sm−k ⊂{ n − k,...,n}. We show that then n − k − 1 ∈
Sm−k−1 ⊂{ n − k − 1,...,n}. Obviously, it is not the case that Sm−k−1 ⊂{ n − k,...,n}
as this would violate the minimality of {S1,...,S m}. Suppose it is not true that Sm−k−1 ⊂
{n − k − 1,...,n}, so the lowest ranked player in Sm−k−1 is i  <n− k − 1. For all Sj,
it holds that pn−k−1(Sj) < 1/n, so 1/n =
 m
j=1 λjpn−k−1(Sj) < 1/n, a contradiction. It
follows that the lowest ranked player in Sm−k−1 is n − k − 1. This completes the proof of
the induction step, and it follows as a corollary that m = n.
It remains to be shown that x = mπ(v), i.e, that for k  =1 ,...,n,
 n
i=n−k ,x i =
v({n − k ,...,n}) holds. Since x is economically stable, it follows that, for k  =1 ,...,n,
 n
i=n−k  xi ≥ v({n − k ,...,n}).
Obviously, it holds that xn = v({n}). We proceed with an induction argument.
Assume it is true that, for some k ,
 n






xi + xn−k −1
= v({n − k
 ,...,n})+xn−k −1
= v({n − k




≤ v({n − k
  − 1,...,n})+v(Sn−k −1 \{ n − k




≤ v({n − k
  − 1,...,n}),
where the second to last inequality uses the convexity of v and the last inequality the
economic stability of x. Q.E.D.
When the power function p is π-compatible, a highly ranked player is able to extract all
payoﬀs from lower-ranked players, up to the point where the lower-ranked players could
form a deviating coalition. In this case, the socially stable core consists of a unique element,
corresponding to the marginal vector mπ(v).
In general, the socially stable core need not consist of a unique element as was
already demonstrated by Example 4.5. However, in general, barring exceptional cases,
9the socially stable core consists of a ﬁnite number of payoﬀs. To show this, observe that
once the number of players is ﬁxed, a structured TU-game is completely determined by
the tuple of payoﬀs v, which can be represented by a vector in I R
2n−1, and the tuple of
power functions, which can be represented by a vector in S(2n−1)n. The standard topology
and measure on I R
2n−1×S(2n−1)n therefore induce a topology and a measure on structured
TU-games.
Theorem 4.8 Let N be the set of players. Then there is an open set of payoﬀs and power
functions with full Lebesgue measure V × P such that for any (v,p) ∈ V × P, the socially
stable core of the structured TU-game Γ=( N,v,p) consists of a ﬁnite number of elements.
Proof. For S ∈N, deﬁne the vector e(S)b yei(S)=1i fi ∈ S and ei(S)=0i fi/ ∈ S. We
deﬁne the closed subset W of I R
n with measure zero by
W = ∪(S1,...,Sn−1)∈N n−1span[e(S1),...,e(Sn−1)].
Next we deﬁne the open subset V of I R
2n−1 with full measure by
V = {v ∈ IR
2n−1 |∀ (S1,...,S n) ∈N
n with Sj  = Sj  when j  = j
 , (vS1,...,v Sn) / ∈ W}.
Finally, we deﬁne the open subset P of S(2n−1)n with full measure as the set of vectors
p =( p(S))S∈N for which it holds that any selection of n vectors from the vectors p(S),
S ∈N, and eN yields an independent set of vectors.
We now examine the socially stable core for the structured TU-game Γ = (N,v,p),
where (v,p) ∈ V × P. All socially stable core elements are obtained by considering, for
all minimal stable collections of coalitions {S1,...,S m}, the solutions to the system of
equations
x(Sj)=v(Sj),j=1 ,...,m.
In fact, the union over all stable collections of solutions to the corresponding system is a
superset of the socially stable core. Since {S1,...,S m} is a stable collection, there exists a
vector of weights λ such that
m  
j=1
λjp(Sj)=1 /n · e
N.
Moreover, {S1,...,S m} is minimal, so that the vectors p(Sj) are independent, and in
particular m ≤ n. Since p ∈ P, it holds that m = n.
Consider the system of equations,
x(Sj)=v(Sj),j=1 ,...,n.
10If the vectors e(Sj) are all independent, it follows that this system has exactly one solution,
and therefore we obtain at most one socially stable core element. When the vectors e(Sj)
are not all independent, it follows from our deﬁnition of V that this system of equations
has no solution. Hence, there is at most one solution for each minimal stable collection.
Since the number of minimal stable collections is ﬁnite, this proves the theorem. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.8 shows that in general the socially stable core reﬁnes the core to a great
extent. There is typically only a ﬁnite number of payoﬀs in the socially stable core.
5 Sequencing games
A one-machine sequencing situation, see e.g. Curiel (1988) or Hamers (1995) is described
as a triple (N,q,c), where N = {1,...,n} is the set of jobs in a queue to be processed,
q ∈ IR
n
+ is an n-vector with qi the processing time of job i and c =( ci)i∈N is a collection of
cost functions ci:I R + → IR +, specifying the costs ci(t) when t is the total time needed to
complete job i. For an ordering ρ on N describing the positions of the jobs in the queue,
the completion time of job i is given by Ti(ρ)=
 
{j|ρ(j)≤ρ(i)} qj, i.e. the completion time
is the sum of its waiting time and its own processing time, and the costs of processing i
are given by Ci(ρ)=ci(Ti(ρ)). The total costs of a coalition S ⊆ N given an ordering ρ
are given by CS(ρ)=
 
i∈S Ci(ρ). In the sequel we assume without loss of generality that
the initial positions of the jobs in the queue are given by the ordering ρ0 with ρ0(i)=i for













Now, each coalition S of jobs can obtain cost savings by rearranging the jobs amongst the
members of S. Then the minimal cost of the grand coalition is given by
CN =m i n
ρ CN(ρ).
However, members of any other coalition S can only rearrange their positions under the
condition that the members of S are not allowed to ‘jump’ over jobs outside S. So, an
ordering ρ is admissible for S if for any j  ∈ S the set of its predecessors does not change
with respect to the initial situation, i.e. if for any j  ∈ S it holds that {k ∈ N | ρ(k) <
ρ(j)} = {k ∈ N | ρ0(k) <ρ 0(j)} = {k ∈ N | k<j }. Let A(S) be the set of admissible
orderings for S. Then the minimal cost of S is given by
CS =m i n
ρ∈A(S)
CS(ρ).
11This gives the cost savings sequencing game (N,v) with N the set of jobs as the set of
players and characteristic function v given by
v(S)=CS(ρ
0) − CS,S ⊆ N.
In the following, we use the terminology players instead of jobs. Obviously, since for
any S only orderings in A(S) are admissible, only connected coalitions (i.e. coalitions
of consecutive players) can realise cost reductions. Therefore, for i<j , denote the set
{i,i +1 ,...,j} of consecutive players by [i,j] and let L denote the set of all coalitions of
consecutive players, i.e.
L = {T ∈N |T =[ i,j], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n}.
For ease of notation, in the following we denote v(S)b yv[i,j] when S =[ i,j].
For some S ∈N ,l e tP(S) be the unique minimal partition of S in coalitions of
consecutive players, i.e. T ∈Lif T ∈ P(S)a n dT1 ∪ T2  ∈Lfor any pair T1,T 2 ∈ P(S).





i.e. the value of a coalition S is equal to the sum of the values of the coalitions of consecutive
players in its unique minimal partition. From this property it follows immediately that the
characteristic function is superadditive and also satisﬁes permutational convexity, implying
that v has a non-empty core. In particular, let u and   be the two permutations on N
deﬁned by u(i)=i, i =1 ,2,...,n and  (i)=n +1− i, i =1 ,2,...,n. Further, denote
µ(v)=mu(v)a n dλ(v)=m (v) as the corresponding marginal value vectors. Then it
follows that v satisﬁes the permutational convexity conditions for the two permutations u
and  , implying that the two marginal vectors µ(v)a n dλ(v)a r ei nC(v).
Under certain conditons on the power function we have that µ(v), respectively λ(v),
is the unique element of the socially stable core. In particular, for any power function
p:N→Sn satisfying for every S ∈N
pi(S) <p j(S) when i<j , i ,j∈ S, (1)
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1
For any sequencing game it holds that µ(v) is the unique element of SC(v,p) when p
satisﬁes condition (1).
12Proof. We ﬁrst show that µ(v) ∈ SC(v,p). Let Iu be the collection of coalitions given by
I
u = {[1,h] | h =1 ,2,...,n}.
Clearly, Iu is a socially stable collection of coalitions for any power function p satisfying
(1). Moreover, Iu sustains µ(v), since µ(v) is the marginal vector of the game with respect
to the permutation u, so that
 h
i=1 µi(v)=v[1,h]. Hence, µ(v) is in the core and is socially
stable, and therefore µ(v) ∈ SC(v,p).
To prove that SC(v,p) contains no other payoﬀ vectors, let B be any collection of
stable coalitions for the power function p sustaining a vector x ∈ C(v), i.e. x(S) ≤ v(S)f o r
all S ∈B . From Deﬁnition 3.3 and condition (1), it follows that for any k ≤ n − 1, there
must be a coalition S ∈B , such that k ∈ S and k +1 ∈ S. Let Sk denote such a coalition












Since x ∈ C(v), we also have that x(T) ≥ v(T) for all T ∈ P(Sk). Therefore,
x(T)=v(T), for any T ∈ P(S
k).
Clearly, for k = 1 it holds that {1}∈P(S1) and thus x1 = v(1). We now proceed by
induction and assume that for certain k ≤ n − 1 it holds that x(T)=v(T)f o rT =[ 1 ,h],
h =1 ,...,k−1. For k it holds that [j,k] ∈ P(Sk)f o rs o m ej ≤ k and thus x[j,k] ≤ v[j,k].
Hence x[j,k]=v[j,k], since x ∈ C(v). So, with the induction assumption it follows that
x[1,k]=x[1,j− 1] + x[j,k]=v[1,j− 1] + v[j,k].
From the superadditivity it follows that v[1,j−1]+v[j,k] ≤ v[1,k], while x ∈ C(v) implies
that x[1,k] ≥ v[1,k]. Hence x[1,k]=v[1,k] and therefore x(T)=v(T) for all T =[ 1 ,h],
h =1 ,...,n−1. Of course, also x[1,n]=v[1,n] holds. Therefore it follows that for any k
it holds that
xk = x[1,k] − x[1,k− 1] = v[1,k] − v[1,k− 1],
showing that x = µ(v). Hence, x ∈ SC(v,p)i ﬀx = µ(v). Q.E.D.
Similarly, the vector λ(v) is the unique element of the socially stable core for any
power function p:N→IR
n
+ \{ 0n} satisfying for every S ∈N
pi(S) <p j(S) when i>j , i ,j∈ S. (2)
13Now, the collection of coalitions I  given by
I
  = {[h,n] | h =1 ,2,...,n}
is a socially stable collection. Moreover, by deﬁnition of the marginal vector λ(v)=m (v),
we have that
 n
i=hλi(v)=v[h,n]. Hence, λ(v) is in the core and is also sustained by I ,
so λ(v) ∈ SC(v,p). The next theorem says that it is also the unique element in SC(v,p).
The proof goes analogously to the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2
For any sequencing game it holds that λ(v) is the unique element of SC(v,p) when p
satisﬁes condition (2).
We now consider the special case of linear costs, i.e., ci(t)=αit for all t ≥ 0 with
αi > 0. It is well-known that the characteristic function v is convex, see e.g. Curiel (1988)
or Hamers (1995). Moreover, in these references it has been shown that under linear costs





where ghk =m a x ( 0 ,α kqh − αhqk) is the gain of a switch between player h and k in any
ordering such that player h is directly in front of k. Now, the net-costs of player h resulting
from µ(v) are given by the costs of the waiting time in the initial order minus the savings
obtained from cooperation, i.e., the net-costs cu
h(N,q,c) of player h ∈ N in the linear cost



















So, according to this solution all the savings obtained from a switch of player h with any of
i t sp r e d e c e s s o r sg o e st op l a y e rh.F e r n ´ andez, Borm, Hendrickx and Tijs (2002) show that
this cost-assignment rule is the unique solution being stable (i.e. cu(N,q,c)i si nt h ec o r eo f
the cost-game for any linear cost sequencing situation (N,q,c)) and satisfying the so-called
property of Drop Out Monotonicity (DOM). Clearly, the stableness property follows from
the fact that µ(v) is in the core of the cost-savings game. To state DOM, let (N−k,q −k,c −k)
with player set N−k = N \{ k} be the (n − 1)-player sequencing situation obtained when
player k leaves the queue (i.e., job k is cancelled) and let v−k be the corresponding char-
acteristic function. Then a cost assignment rule r assigning costs rh(N,q,c) for all h ∈ N
satisﬁes DOM if for any linear cost situation (N,q,c) it holds that
rh(N−k,q −k,c −k) ≤ rh(N,q,c),h ∈ N−k,
14i.e. if one of the players leaves the queue, for each of the remaining players the costs are
non-increasing.










h(N,q,c) − min(αhqk,α kqh) <c
u
h(N,q,c),h = k +1 ,...,n.
So, for the players in front of k there is no change in the net-costs, whereas for any player
h after k the decrease αhqk in initial costs when k leaves the queue is bigger than the loss
of the cost-savings gkh (if positive) from a switch between k and h. The DOM property
advocated in Fern´ andez et al. (2002) seems to be very appealing and reasonable: when
player k drops out, the players in front of k are not aﬀected, while for the players after k
the costs are decreasing.
On the other hand, let (Nj,q,c) denote the adjusted sequencing situation in which
some player j refuses to cooperate with any player k>j . As a consequence of this refusal
of j, any coalition [i,h], i ≤ j<hcannot form and hence all the gains gih of a switch
between i and h, i ≤ j<hcannot be realized anymore. Let vj be the corresponding
characteristic function of the cost-savings game. For S ∈N , let P j(S) be the unique
minimal partition of S in coalitions of consecutive players not containing both j and j +1,
i.e. T ∈Lif T ∈ Pj(S) and if T1 ∪ T2 ∈Lf o rs o m ep a i rT1,T 2 ∈ Pj(S), then j ∈ T1 and






i.e. the value of a coalition S is equal to the sum of the values of the coalitions in its
unique minimal partition Pj(S). From this property it follows immediately that the net-














i=j+1 gih,h = j +1 ,...,n.
Comparing this with the costs cu
h(N,q,c) of the original situation, it follows that the costs
do not change for the players 1,...,j, whereas a player h after j looses all the gains gih,
i ≤ j, and therefore suﬀers from an increase in the costs with
 
i≤j gih. So, the unique core
outcome satisfying DOM has the serious drawback that it does not give any incentive to a
player to cooperate with its successors in the queue: not cooperating does not hurt her. To
make the point more clear, consider a two player sequencing situation. Of course, nothing
15happens if the initial order of 1 before 2 is optimal already. So, suppose it is optimal to
reverse the initial order and to place 2 in front of 1 generating a decrease g12 of the costs.
According to the payoﬀ vector µ(v), this decrease is fully assigned to player 2. Why should
player 1 be willing to cooperate by agreeing to take the second position? On the contrary,
player 1 has the power to play the noncooperative ultimatum game and to oﬀer the ﬁrst
place in the queue to player 2 if player 2 is willing to give all the gains of this change to
player 1, i.e. player 1 is willing to sell his place against a price equal to α1q2 (the additional
costs of waiting for player 1) plus the gains g12 of this trade.
Extending this reasoning we obtain that any player j<ncan decide upon whether
or not to cooperate with his successors. This can be modelled by any power function
p:N→Sn satisfying condition (2). From Theorem 5.2 we know that for this power vector
the marginal vector λ(v)=m (v) is the unique element in SC(v,p). So, the marginal
vector λ(v) is economically stable and socially stable with respect to a social structure
reﬂecting the dominance of any player j over its successors in the sequence. The resulting









Of course, this cost rule does not satisfy DOM, but any player i gets the gains of switching
with her successors and therefore is willing to cooperate with her successors.
6 The water distribution problem
In their paper ‘Sharing a river’ Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of the
optimal distribution of water to agents located along a river from upstream to downstream.
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents, numbered successively from upstream to down-
stream and let fi ≥ 0 be the ﬂow of water entering the river between agent i − 1a n di,
i =1 ,...,n, with f1 the inﬂow before the most upstream agent 1. Agent i, i =1 ,...,n,
has a quasi-linear utility function given by ui(xi,t i)=bi(xi)+ti, where ti is a monetary
compensation to agent i, xi is the amount of water allocated to agent i, and bi:I R + → IR a
continuous non-decreasing function yielding the beneﬁt bi(xi) to agent i of the consumption
xi of water. An allocation is a pair (x,t) ∈ IR
n
+×IR











The ﬁrst condition is a budget condition and says that the total amount of compensations
is non-positive, i.e. the compensations only redistribute the total welfare. The second
16condition reﬂects that any agent can use the water that entered upstream, but that the
water inﬂow downstream of some agent can not be allocated to this agent. Because of
the quasi-linearity and the possibility of making money transfers, an allocation is Pareto
optimal if and only if the distribution of the water streams maximizes the total beneﬁts,
i.e. the water distribution x∗ ∈ IR
n












fi,j =1 ,...,n. (3)
A welfare distribution allocates the total beneﬁts of an optimal water distribution x∗ over
the agents, i.e. it is a vector z ∈ IR





i). Clearly, any welfare distribution can be implemented by the allocation (x,t)
with xi = x∗
i and ti = zi − bi(x∗
i), i =1 ,...,n.
The problem to ﬁnd a reasonable welfare distribution can be modelled as a TU-
game. Obviously, for any pair of players i,j with j>iit holds that the water inﬂow
entering the river before the upstream agent i can only be allocated to the downstream
agent j if all agents between i and j cooperate, otherwise any agent between i and j can
take the ﬂow from i to j for its own use. Hence, only coalitions of consecutive agents
are admissible. Clearly, for S = N, v(N)=
 n
i=1 bi(x∗
i) with x∗ ∈ IR
n the solution of
























fk,h = i,...,j. (4)
Without loss of generality we normalize the beneﬁt functions by taking bi(fi) = 0 implying
that v({i})=bi(fi)=0 ,i =1 ,...,n, so that the values v(S), |S|≥2 represent the
net-gains of cooperating. Again, for an arbitrary coalition S ∈N, the value v(S) is equal





with P(S) the minimal partition as deﬁned in the previous section. Clearly, the game v
is superadditive and hence it follows from Granot and Huberman (1982) that v is per-
mutationally convex for the permutations u and  . Consequently, both marginal vectors
µ(v)a n dλ(v) are core solutions. In case all functions bi are diﬀerentiable with derivative
going to inﬁnity as xi tends to zero, strictly increasing and strictly concave, Ambec and
17Sprumont (2002) have even shown that the game is convex and hence the core contains all
marginal vectors.
Under the conditions for convexity, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) have shown that
the marginal vector corresponding to the permutation u is the unique element in the core
of the game satisfying a so-called fairness condition. This condition (quite diﬀerent from
the fairness condition of Myerson to characterize the Shapley value) says that any coalition
S gets at most its aspiration level, being the highest utility it can obtain when it may use
all the water of all the agents 1,...,  s,w h e r e  s =m a x {s | s ∈ S}. Clearly, this implies
that any coalition [1,j] can get at most v[1,j], j =1 ,...,n, so that it trivially follows that
indeed the marginal vector mu(v) assigning µi(v)=v[1,i] − v[1,i− 1], i =1 ,...,n,i st h e
unique candidate in the core satisfying the aspiration requirements. For the proof that it
indeed satisﬁes the requirements we refer to Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
As in the sequencing situation again we have that the payoﬀ vector µ(v)h a st h e
property that when a player j does not want to cooperate, the players in front of j, including
j itself are not hurt. Like in the sequencing game, this is a very counterintuitive outcome.
Although any upstream coalition [1,j] can prevent that coalition [j +1 ,n] gets more than
v[j +1 ,n]b yu s i n ga l lﬂ o w sf1,...,f j by itself, all beneﬁts from cooperating go to the
coalition [j +1,n]. Again the outcome µ(v) has the serious drawback that it does not give
any incentive to a player j to cooperate with its successors in the queue. Repeating the
reasoning once more, again consider a two agent situation. In this case there is no gain of
cooperation when in the optimal solution player 1 fully consumes its upstream inﬂow f1.
However, suppose it is optimal to allocate a part of f1 to the second agent. According to
the outcome µ(v), agent 1 is just compensated by agent 2 for its loss of utility, i.e. player
1 receives a compensation t1 = b1(f1) −b1(x∗
1), giving her utility b1(f1)=v({1}) = 0 . So,
like in the sequencing game, there is no reason for player 1 to cooperate. However, player 1
has the power to play the noncooperative ultimatum game and to pass the stream f1−x∗
1 to
player 2 if this player is willing to give up all the gains of cooperation, i.e. player 1 is willing
to sell this stream against a price (or compensation t1)e q u a lt ov[1,2] − v({2})=v[1,2].
Player 2 is indiﬀerent to accepting this oﬀer or not and therefore is willing to accept the
oﬀer (or any slightly lower price). Also in this river game we may argue that player 1
is in control of whether or not to cooperate by letting through a part of its water inﬂow
f1. In general, any player j<nis in control of cooperation with its successors. This can
be modelled by a power function p:N→IR
n
+ \{ 0n} satisfying for any pair i,j ∈ T the
condition (2). As in the sequencing situation, the collection of coalitions I  is socially stable
and sustains the core outcome λ(v). So, λ(v) ∈ SC(v,p) yields an outcome reﬂecting to a
social structure in which any player j dominates its successors in the sense that player j
controls the water inﬂow up to j.
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